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THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
QUEBEC LIBEL LAW, 1848-2004©
BY JOSEPH KARY"

In 1848, a Quebec judge changed the law of
defamation to accord with the newly-applicable
constitutional right to freedom of speech. His decision
and those that followed seem strange now that the
Supreme Court of Canada has held that Charter rights
do not apply to private law. These decisions show that
the constitutionalization of libel law was not an
American innovation, but rather one that emerged in
Canada over a century earlier. This article analyzes the
Quebec cases in detail, and suggests that they were
grounded in liberal ideas about the British Constitution
that were prevalent in Lower Canada at the time of the
Rebellions. It then goes on to discuss how Charter rights
have changed Quebec defamation law at the dawn of the
twenty-first century, and maintains that Quebec
jurisprudence can be useful precedent for the
development of the tort of defamation in the common
law provinces.

En 1848, un juge du Qu6bec a modifi6 le droit de
la diffamation, pour l'harmoniser au droit
constitutionnel i la libert6 d'expression, d'application
ricente. Son jugement, et ceux qui s'ensuivirent, peuvent
sembler curieux, maintenant que la Cour Supr6me du
Canada a statu6 que les droits garantis par la Charte ne
s'appliquent pas au droit privL Cesjugements montrent
que la constitutionnalisation du droit de la diffamation
ne repr6sentait en rien une innovation am6ricaine, mais
plut6t une nouveaut6 venue du Canada, un si~cle plus
t6t qu'aux Etats-Unis. Cet article analyse dans le d6tail
les affaires jug6es au Qu6bec, et sugg re qu'elles
partaient des id6es lib6rales au sujet de la Constitution
britannique, dominantes au Bas-Canada h '6poque des
Rebellions. L'article se poursuit par une dissertation sur
la faon dont les droits garantis par la Charte ont modifi6
le droit de la diffamation au Qu6bec A I'aube du XXI'
sigcle, et soutient que la jurisprudence du Qu6bec peut
constituer un pr6cddent utile au d6veloppement du d6lit
civil de diffamation dans les provinces de common law.
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Until 1982, Canada ... never looked at notions of free speech from a perspective of freedom
of expression. There was hardly any discussion in Canadian courts about the value of free
speech.
--- Edward Greenspan'
I am prepared to express an opinion as to our law of libel ... and that opinion is, that what we
read of the doctrine of that country from which we have our civil law, that is inconsistent with
the liberty of the press (as understood in England) is to be modified so as to leave intact that
constitutional principle. That this boon, so much and so deservedly valued by a British
subject, necessarily exists in all British colonies. That it is unimpaired by existing legislation
at the time they became part of the realm (being part of the public law) .... With this opinion
deliberately given on this occasion ... I entertain a hope that we shall hear no more of the
imperfection of the law of this country, emphatically called the law of libel in Lower Canada,
as regards the liberty of the press.
---Judge Jean-Roch Rolland

I.

2

INTRODUCTION

When Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms' was introduced
many commentators predicted, or hoped, that its guarantee of freedom of
expression would reshape the common law of defamation.4 The predictions
did not come true. In the United States, first amendment guarantees of
freedom of speech had made it more difficult for public figures to sue for
libel, requiring that actual malice be proven before they could win a lawsuit.
The Supreme Court of Canada, however, has so far strongly rejected any

I "Freedom

of Expression in Canada: 'Ifs, Buts & Whereases' (1996) 29 L. Soc'y Gaz. 212 at 213-

14.
2 Gugy v. Hicks (1848), as cited in Mousseau v. Dougall (1871), 5 R.L. 442 at 446-47, Rolland
J.[Gugy v. Hicks].
3 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
R.J. Sharpe, "The Charter and Defamation: Will the Courts Protect the Media?" in Phillip
Anisman & Allen M. Linden, eds., The Media, the Courts and the Charter (Agincourt: Carswell, 1986);
M.R. Doody, "Freedom of the Press, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and a New
Category of Qualified Privilege" (1983) 61 Can. Bar Rev. 124; John D. Richard & Stuart Robertson,
The Charter and the Media (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Foundation, 1985); Amy Stein, "Libel Law and the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Towards A Broader Protection For Media Defendants"
(1987) 10 Fordham Int'l L.J. 750; Lewis Klar, "If You Don't Have Something Good To Say About
Someone" in David Schneiderman, ed., Freedom of Expression and the Charter (Toronto: Thomson
Professional Publishing, 1991) at 261 [Klar]; Rodney Smolla, "Balancing Freedom of Expression and
Protection of Reputation Under the Charter" (in David Schneiderman, ed., ibid. at 272) [Smolla];
Richard Dearden, "Constitutional Protection for Defamatory Words Published About the Conduct of
Public Officials" (in David Schneiderman, ed., ibid. at 287).
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such "Americanization" of libel law. It has treated defamation purely as a
matter of private law, one to which Charterprotections do not apply.
This paper presents one argument for the constitutionalization 5 of
libel law based on uniquely Canadian case law, drawn from the efforts of
nineteenth-century Quebec judges to integrate English parliamentary
principles into a civil law framework. Quebec courts decided as early as
1848 that constitutional protections of freedom of speech restricted the
scope of libel law where public figures were concerned. They applied
different rules to public and private figures long before any such distinction
was recognized in American constitutional law, and the distinction was
endorsed by judges of the Supreme Court of Canada in the first decades of
the twentieth century. The Quebec decisions suggest that libel law can be
changed to comply with Charter rights, not by following American
examples, but in accordance with the historical evolution of Canadian law.
After giving a brief summary of the common law of defamation and
the constitutionalization of libel law in the United States, I will then provide
a detailed discussion of how Lower Canadian6 judges first declared that
Quebec libel law should be amended to conform to a new constitutional
system. Some commentators have interpreted these decisions as being a
wholesale adoption of common law principles, which is part of the reason
why so little attention is paid to them now; I will argue, instead, that the
decisions were an affirmation of the civil law tradition. Partially submerged
under the legal positivism and isolationism of the first half of the twentieth
century, these ideas re-emerged in a new form after the Canadian Charter
and the Quebec Charterof Human Rights and Freedoms7 passed into law,
even as the Quebec courts adopted a standard of care in defamation
lawsuits that brought the law close to the American constitutional standard.
The recent Charter-based case law from Quebec is of interest
because of its result: it relaxes the traditional strict liability test for
5The word "constitutionalize" in the sense used here is of relatively recent American
coinage.
David Mellinkoff defines it as "a slangy pejorative: to subject something to the burden of passing
constitutional muster." See Mellinkoff's Dictionaryof American Legal Usage (Minnesota: West, 1992)
s.v. "constitutionalize". I use the word as defined in Black's Law Dictionary, 7th ed., s.v.
"constitutionalize": "to make constitutional; to bring into line with a constitution" and "to make a
constitutional question out of a question of law." The definition encompasses both changes to the law
required to comply with constitutional provisions and changes that are made in accordance with
constitutional values. On this distinction, see Retail Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580
v. Dolphin Delivey, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 at 603 [Dolphin Delivery] and Hill v. Church of Scientology of
Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 at 1164-72 [Hill].
6 What is now the province of Quebec was officially named Lower Canada from 1791 to 1841. The
name continued in common use for some time after that.
7 R.S.Q., c. C-12.
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defamation. In the common law provinces, journalists can as a general rule
be held liable if they publish a falsehood, but in Quebec they will not be
held liable so long as they have taken reasonable care before publication to
verify its truth. The older, largely forgotten, jurisprudence is of interest
because of its method: it used new constitutional law principles to make
major changes in the law of defamation. It was for the most part based on
principles of public law, which Quebec shares with the rest of Canada, and
as such should have more persuasive value in other provinces than decisions
based solely on Quebec's Civil Code.8 Quebec judges applied constitutional
principles to libel law before Canada even had a written constitution, and
their decisions are worthwhile precedents for those who wish to argue that
the Chartershould apply to the common law of libel. 9
II.

COMMON LAW DEFAMATION

Libel and slander are the common law remedies for injury done to
a person's reputation."0 If a statement is made about a person to a third
party that lowers that person in the esteem of right-thinking people or holds
8For a recent example of the use of Quebec public law jurisprudence as precedent in Ontario, see
Corporationof the CanadianCivil LibertiesAssociation v. Ontario Civilian Commissionon Police Services
(2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 649 at 675 (C.A.). In Farberv.Royal Trust Co., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 846 at 865, the
Supreme Court of Canada stated that judges should consider decisions from both legal systems in cases
where the courts in the two systems have adopted similar solutions based on similar principles. The
Supreme Court has cited Quebec civil law jurisprudence as authority with respect to the common law
of libel. See Hillsupranote 5 at 172, citing Gazette PrintingCo. v. Shallow, [1908] 41 S.C.R. 339 [Gazette
Printing].
This paper does not present a normative or theoretical argument as to what
influence the
Charter should have on the law of defamation. Such analyses can be found in Denis Boivin,
"Accommodating Freedom of Expression and Reputation in the Common Law of Defamation"(1997)
22 Queen's L.J. 229; June Ross, "The Common Law of Defamation: Failure to Enter the Age of the
Charter"(1996) 35 Alta. L. Rev. 117; and David Lepofsky, "Making Sense of the Libel Chill Debate:
Do Libel Laws 'Chill' the Exercise of Freedom of Expression?" (1994) 4 N.J.C.L. 168. There is a wealth
of normative and philosophical discussion on the application of the American First Amendment to
defamation law. See, among many others, Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the
American Constitution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996) c. 7, 8; Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The
Fourth Estate and the Constitution: Freedom of the Pressin America (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1991) c. 3, 4; R. George Wright, "Why Free Speech Cases Are As Hard (And As Easy) As They
Are" (2001) 68 Tennessee L. Rev. 335; and articles mentioned in Frank Houdek, "Constitutional
Limitations on Libel Actions: A Bibliography ofNew York Times v. Sullivan and Its Progeny, 1964-1984"
(1984) 6 Comm/Ent 447. For an analysis of the differing norms embodied in American and Canadian
law, see Douglas Bicket, "Drifting Apart Together: Diverging Conceptions of Free Expression in the
North American Judicial Tradition" (1998) 20(4) Comm. & L. 1 [Bicket].
10 In the common
law, libel refers to written defamation and slander to spoken words, with
variations in the rules applying to each. These terms are also used in Quebec cases, but with no legal
consequences flowing from the distinction.
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them up to ridicule, then the person about whom the statement was made
can sue for defamation.
Truth is an absolute defence to a defamation claim in the common
law. If the defendant can prove that the statement was true, the lawsuit
fails. Justifiable error or innocent mistakes, however, are not excuses. No
matter how reasonable it may have been to believe in the truth of the
statement, one will be liable if it turns out to have been false. Even if there
was no intention of referring to the plaintiff, one can be liable if other
people took the remark to be about the plaintiff. Malice is technically an
element of the tort, but in most circumstances it is no more than a historical
artifact; there is no general requirement to prove malice and it is usually
presumed.
In order to protect certain forms of expression against the chilling
effect of libel suits, the courts and legislature have marked off certain kinds
of speech as privileged. Statements made in the course of judicial or
legislative proceedings are absolutely privileged; they cannot expose the
speaker to liability for defamation even if the statement was made for the
sole purpose of harming another's reputation. A witness cannot be sued
under any circumstances for statements made in court, and litigants cannot
be sued for what they or their lawyers write in court documents. Other
kinds of statements are protected by qualified privileges, meaning that the
speaker will be exempt from liability unless malice can be proven. One kind
of qualified privilege applies to statements made out of duty to someone
who had an interest in hearing them, as for example credit ratings and
employer references. Insulting and hurtful opinions may be protected as
"fair comment," provided that the facts upon which they are based are true,
and provided that they are made on a matter of public interest.1
Two features of common law libel-truth as a defence and the
absolute privilege for courtroom testimony-became central to the
constitutionalization of Quebec libel law, as judges began to integrate
equivalents of these defences into the law inherited from France. I will
discuss these attempts in more detail, after describing how libel law became
constitutionalized in the United States.

11 For the basic principles of libel law set out above, see Clement Gatley, Patrick Milmo & W.V.H.
Rogers, Gatley on Libel andSlander, 9th ed., (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1998), especially paras. 3149, 221, 281, 289-90, 341-340, 351, 441-582, 691ff, and 761; Jeremy S. Williams, The Law of Libel and
Slanderin Canada,2d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1988); and Raymond Brown, The Law of Defamation
in Canada,2d. ed., (Scarborough: Carswell, 1994).
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CONSTITUTIONS

For most of American history, the law of libel in England and the
United States was substantially the same. The American constitutional
abridging the freedom of
provision that "Congress shall make no law ...
speech, or of the press ...
, was considered not to apply to defamation. 143
This belief was shattered in the 1964 case of New York Times v. Sullivan,
when the Supreme Court overturned a state court's finding of libel on the
grounds that it infringed the defendant's freedom of speech. Libel law had
become subject to the constitution, and, in the aftermath of the decision,
"the common law applicable to libelous utterances that had prevailed in the
United States since the country was founded was all but swept away."'"
The case that started this flood was brought against The New York
Times by an Alabama Police Commissioner, over an advertisement in the
newspaper that had solicited funds for the civil rights movement. The
advertisement described the persecution of Martin Luther King and his
followers by the police, but in an exaggerated and mistaken way. Among
other errors, it claimed that King had been arrested by the police seven
times, rather than only four, and that university students had been
padlocked in their dining hall when in fact they had not been. The Police
Commissioner claimed that statements in the advertisement constituted a
libel against the police and, implicitly, against himself. The errors of fact in
the advertisement meant that the defendants could not rely on the defence
of fair comment. The Alabama courts had found in the Commissioner's
favour, and the Times appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Police Commissioner claimed that the Supreme Court had no
jurisdiction to hear the case. He argued that libel law did not raise
constitutional issues, because the First Amendment offered protection only
against restrictions imposed by government, not against lawsuits brought by
private individuals. The Court rejected this, finding that the fact that a libel
action is brought and enforced through the courts was a sufficient show of
state power to justify the application of constitutional principles. As the
majority explained, "it matters not that that law has been applied in a civil
action and that it is common law only, though supplemented by statute ....

12 U.S. Const. amend.
1.
13 Beauharnoisv. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) at 266 and
at 292ff.
14 376 U.S. 254 (1964) [Sullivan].
15Edward Hudon, "The Supreme Court of the United States and the Law of Libel:
A Review of

the Decided Cases" (1979) 20 C. de D. 833 at 853.
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The test is not the form in which state power has been applied but,
whatever the form, whether such power has, in fact, been exercised."16
The Court weighed the public interest in a free discussion of
political issues against the rights of public officials to protect their
reputations and settled on a compromise between the two. The Court
decided that a public official must bear the additional burden of proving
"actual malice"-that is, that the defendant published with knowledge that
the imputations were false, or with reckless disregard of whether they were
false or not.
The Sullivan decision was binding on lower courts only in cases
concerning public figures, but in the years after it was decided, the standard
of care in a defamation action was relaxed in most jurisdictions even in
cases where constitutional protections did not apply. The influential
American Restatement of the Law of Torts provides that the plaintiff must
prove the defendant was at least negligent in making the defamatory
statement, 17 and most state jurisdictions have adopted the negligence
standard.18
A distinction between private and public figures similar to the one
adopted in Sullivan exists in the law of Scotland and the law of the
European Community 9 and, when the Canadian Charterwas introduced,
several commentators expressed the hope that it would cause something
like the Sullivan standard to be introduced into Canadian law. As it is,
journalists are held to a higher standard of professional liability than any
other professional: doctors who cripple their patients through a mistake of
judgment are not liable to those patients if a reasonably competent
practitioner could have made the same mistake, but an honest mistake
made by journalists can make them liable even if they exercised all
reasonable care. A change in libel law to an "actual malice" standard could
have moved journalistic mistakes from a strict liability standard to one
based on fault.
Expectations of change were dealt a serious blow by the Supreme
Court of Canada in RWDSU, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery.20 The Court
decided that picketing should be considered a form of expression protected
by the Charter; however, it decided that this protection did not apply to
common law remedies in a suit between private parties. Where the Sullivan
16 Sullivan, supra note 14 at 265.
17

Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts §580B (1965) [Restatement].
18 Ibid. at Appendix, Reporter's Note.
19
20

See generally Alistair Bonnington, "Public figure v. private person" (1997) 147 New L.J. 270.
Dolphin Delivery, supra note 5.
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Court had considered the enforcement of the common law to be a form of
government action that opened up the U.S. Court's ruling to constitutional
review, Dolphin Delivery held to the opposite opinion. Although the Court
held that the normal case-by-case evolution of the common law should be
guided by Charter values, it insisted that the Charter had no direct
application to the common law.
Dolphin Delivery did not deal with libel law and did not review the
Sullivan principles themselves. The Supreme Court of Canada did not
consider these principles until a decade later, inManningv.Hill,2 where the
Court held that the Charter did not apply to the common law of libel and
that there was no need to amend libel law to be in accord with fundamental
Charter values. According to Justice Cory for the majority:
Private parties owe each other no constitutional duties and cannot found their cause of
action upon a Charter right. The party challenging the common law cannot allege that the
common law violates a Charter right because, quite simply, Charter rights do not exist in the
absence of state action. The most that the private litigant can do is argue that the common
Charter values.... Far-reaching changes to the common law must be
law is inconsistent with
22
left to the legislature.

Hill dealt with defamatory comments made by a lawyer for the
Church of Scientology at a press conference that was televised and widely
reported in the newspapers. Although the plaintiff had sued the
organizations that reported the statements made at the press conference
together with the lawyer and his client, the claims against the media
defendants were settled before the case came to trial, 23 so that their conduct
was never an issue before the courts. Justice Cory's reasons did leave the
door open a crack to those who would wish to argue in future cases that
journalists should be treated more liberally. He observed that "none of the
factors which prompted the United States Supreme Court to rewrite the
law of defamation in America [in Sullivan] are present in the case at bar.
First, this appeal does not involve the media or political commentary about
,24
government policies ....

21 Hill, supra note 5.
22

Ibid. at 157. On how Canadian courts have made incremental changes in the common law to

reflect Charter values, see Sheila Block & Zarah Walpole, "Application of Charter Values to
Defamation Actions" in Human Rights in the 21st Century: Prospects, Institutions and Processes
(Montreal: Editions Themis, 1997) 77; and Campbell v. Jones (2002), 220 D.L.R. ( 4 ") 201.
23 Michael Doody, "New Common Law Libel Privilege to Report on Court Documents: Hill v.
Church of Scientology of Toronto" (1996) 18 Advocates' Q. 251 at 251.
24
Hill, supra note 5 at 170.
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Even with this caveat, Justice Cory's judgment gave little comfort
to journalists..2 It balanced the public's right to be informed against the
right of the individual to protect her reputation and came out strongly in
favour of the latter, upholding the trial verdict that required the Church to
pay $1.6 million in damages. Justice Cory criticized Sullivan because, in his
view, it had diverted the focus of libel trials from the truth of the impugned
statement to the question of whether the person who made it was negligent,
depriving plaintiffs of the opportunity to vindicate themselves. He also
maintained that the adoption of a negligence standard increased the length
and cost of litigation, and that its protection of false statements had caused
the deprecation of truth in public discourse. For these and other reasons,
Justice Cory stated that "I can see no reason for adopting [the U.S. Sullivan
principles] in Canada in an action between private litigants. 26
Apparently unknown to Justice Cory, however, a negligence test for
libel by journalists had already been adopted in Canada by the Quebec
Court of Appeal in the previous year.27
As I show in the following section, the Supreme Court of Canada,
in making these statements, was not just ignoring the Quebec Court of
Appeal, it was also ignoring its own earlier decisions. The Supreme Court
had in fact acknowledged the constitutionalization of the law of defamation
over eighty years before, accepting a line of jurisprudence going back to the
mid-nineteenth century. Constitutionalization of the common law of libel
is not just a recent American innovation; Canada had adopted similar
principles over a century before they were adopted in the United States.
IV.

QUEBEC DEFAMATION LAW

A.

The Nineteenth CenturyApplication of ConstitutionalPrinciples

There is a long line of jurisprudence in Quebec holding that legal
rules more favourable to freedom of the press should apply to defamation
lawsuits brought by public figures; the law of defamation has a
25 See discussion by Grant Huscroft, "Defamation, Damages and Freedom of Expression in
Canada" (1996) 112 Law Q. Rev. 46 at 47-48.
26
Hill, supra note 5 at 169. Comparative analyses of the Sullivan and Hill decisions can be found
in Marie-France Major, "Sullivan Visits the Commonwealth" (1999) 10 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. I
and Bicket, supra note 9.
27 Societ9 Radio-Canadac. Radio Sept-Iles Inc., [19941 R.J.Q. 1811 (C.A.) [Radio Sept-Iles]. It
should be noted that the Supreme Court's decision in Hill, ibid. at 172-73, did cite an earlier case
concerning the civil law in Quebec as authority concerning the common law, however, referencing
Gazette Printing,supra note 8, as authority concerning qualified privilege.
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constitutional and public law dimension; and the role of a judge in a time
of constitutional change is to modify traditional private law so as to
integrate new constitutional principles with the law of defamation. In this
section, I will demonstrate how that approach began, how it was largely
abandoned, and how Quebec courts have returned to a similar approach in
recent years.
In English private law, truth is an absolute defence. Under the old
French law that applied in Quebec, however, it did not matter whether the
libel was true or false 28unless the libelous allegations were already a matter
of general public knowledge. 29 The law was such that "la vie priv~e doit 6tre
mur6e"-private life has to be walled up.30 Truth could be seen not as a
defence but as an aggravation of the injury: 3' as it was sometimes put, "the
greater the truth, the greater the libel., 3 2 For some time there was a legal
debate over whether it was even permissible for the defendant to include
in their defence an assertion that the statements complained about were
true,33 with some arguing that truth should at least be allowed to be pleaded
as a reason for reducing the damages to be awarded even if it could not be
an actual defense.34
28 Adjutor Rivard, "De ]a libert6 de la presse" in Royal Society of Canada:Proceedings and
Transactions, series 3, vol. 17 (Ottawa: Royal Society of Canada, 1923) 35 at 58 [Rivard, "De lalibert6
de ]a presse"]. In parts of southern France before the French Revolution, truth could be a defence, but
in regions governed by the Coutumes de Paris, which applied in New France, the opposite held true :
Pricev. ChicoutimiPulp Inc. (1915), 51 S.C.R.179 at 207-08 [Price]and Martineauv. Roy (1887), 16 R.L.
257 at 257-60 [Martineau].
29 See e.g. Peter Moogk, "'Thieving Buggers' and 'Stupid Sluts': Insults and Popular Culture in
New France" in Interpreting Canada's Past: Before Confederation, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1986) 62 at 72; Pierre-Basile Mignault, Le droitcivil canadien, vol. 5 (Montreal: C. Theoret, 1901)
at 356 [Mignault]; and Carl Goldenberg, The Law of Delicts Underthe Civil Code of Quebec (Montreal:
Wilson & Lafleur Ltd., 1935) at 47.
30 Gazette Printing,
supra note 8 at 343. See also Genest v. Normand (1873), 5 R.L. 161, and
applying the same principle in a criminal case, R v. Dougall (1874), 18 L.C. Jur. 85 at 93-94 [Dougall].
This emphasis on family privacy was reflected in other areas of the law as well. One of the arguments
against creating a land registry system was that the registration of charges against land would reveal the
"secrets and situations of families": F. Murray Greenwood, From Higher Morality to Autonomous Will:
The Transformation of Quebec's Civil Law, 1774-1866 (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba, Canadian
Legal History Project Working Paper Series, 1992) at 12, n. 32 [Greenwood].
31 Guimond v. Montreal (1872), 4 R.L.
132.
32 Trudelv. La Compagnie d'Imprimirieetde Publicationdu Canada, [1889] 5 Mtl. L. R.. 297 at 303
(Sup. Ct.) [Trudel].
33
Moquin v. Brassard(1875), 20 R.L. 111 and Beauchene v. Couillard(1893), 16 L.N. 306 (C.A.)
both held that truth could not be pleaded as a defence.
34
Fergusonv. Roger, In the Queen sBench, appealside [microform]: CarolineJ.Ferguson,appellant,
and Charles Roger, respondent, (1855) Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions/Institute
canadien de microreproductions historiques, Microfiche series, no 49897; Graham v. McLeish (1883),
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This left journalists in a particularly difficult position; they could be
sued for printing news of a political scandal, even if every detail of the

report was true.
This issue was addressed in the 1848 case of Gugy v. Hicks.35
Although the opinion was part of the charge to the jury and apparently
never reported, the key portions of it proved influential and have been
quoted at length in subsequent cases.3 6 In Gugy, Judge Jean-Roch Rolland

stated that:
[W]hat we read of the doctrine of that country from which we have our civil law that is
inconsistent with the liberty of the press, as understood in England, is to be modified so as
to leave intact that constitutional principle; that this boon, so much and so deservedly valued
by a British subject, necessarily exists in all British colonies; that it is unimpaired by 3existing
7
legislation at the time they became part of the realm (being part of the public law).

The anglophile sentiment of this direction to the jury was not
unusual; similar sentiments were part of general political discourse in the
nineteenth century in French as well as English. 38 They were characteristic

of George-Etienne Cartier's Conservative Party39 and can be found in
judicial opinions and lawyers' closing submissions at least until World War

M.L.R. 475 (5 Q.B).; Bois v. Deschine, [1915] C.S. 178; and Mignault, supra note 29 at 357.
35 Supra note 2.
36

Mousseau v. Dougall(1871), 5 R.L. 442 at 446-47 [Mousseau]; and, more briefly, in Trudel,supra
note 32 at 303. The facts of the case are not mentioned in either of these two citations, but it is likely
that the plaintiff was a litigious lawyer and politician named Bartholomew Conrad Augustus Gugy, who
initiated a number of libel claims during the course of his career, including Exparte Gugy (1858), 6
R.J.R.Q. 267 and (1859), 7 R.J.R.Q. 98; Gugy v. Donahue (1858), 7 R.J.R.Q. 234, 237 and (1861) 7
R.J.R.Q. 246; and Gugy v. Maguire (1863), 11 R.J.R.Q. 240. He was also sued in defamation for calling
a witness a "perjured scoundrel": Ferguson v. Gugy (1861), 10 R.J.R.Q. 84 at 84. The comment was
made in the course of a lawsuit between Gugy and his neighbour over the construction of a wharf, in
which Gugy represented himself. The case lasted 22 years and went twice to the Privy Council in
England: Brown v. Gugy (1864), 10 R.J.R.Q. 1; Gugy v. Brown (1867), 10 R.J.R.Q. 92. See generally
Pierre-Georges Roy, Les avocats de la r~gion de Quebec (lAvis: Le Quotidien, 1936) at 211.
37
Supra note 2 at 446.
38 See Douglas Verney, Three Civilizations,Two Cultures, One State: Canada'sPoliticalTraditions
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1986) at 223, 230; Greg Marquis, "Doing Justice to 'British Justice':
Law, Ideology and Canadian Historiography" in Papers Presentedat the 1987 CanadianLaw in History
Conference,held at Carleton University, Ottawa, June 8-10, 1987 (Ottawa: Carleton University, 1987) at
20; Lawrence A. H. Smith, "Le Canadienand the British Constitution" in Cook, Brown & Berger, eds.,
Constitutionalismand Nationalism in Lower Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969) 17.
39
Brian Young, "Federalism in Quebec: The First Years After Confederation"in J.M. Bumsted,
ed., InterpretingCanada'sPast:After Confederation,vol. 2 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1986) 17
at 20.
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i.4 Judge Rolland's language echoed that of the demands for reform put

forward by Louis-Joseph Papineau's Patriote Party in the 1830s. Their
ninety-two resolutions of 1834 had included the demand that the Legislative
Assembly of Lower Canada
s'est empress~e d'adopter et de consolider dans la province, au moyen des lois, non
seulement le droit constitutionnel et parlementaire anglais, n~cessaire a l'op6ration du son
gouvernement, mais aussi toutes les parties du droit public du Royaume-Uni qui lui ont paru
salutaires et protectrices, et conformes aux besoins et au voeux du peuple ... ,41

The rejection of these resolutions by the imperial government had been one
of the precursors to the Rebellion of 1837.
In the American colonies before the Revolutionary War, many had
adopted that "curious interpretation, or rather misinterpretation, of the
British constitution as a fundamental law which could limit the legislative
'
powers of Parliament. 42
French-Canadian lawyers and politicians in the
first third of the nineteenth century had followed in this tradition,
contesting the power of colonial governors by insisting on the enforceability
of the British Constitution in the colony.43 Judge Rolland's appeal to British
law concerning liberty of the press is in the same tradition as Papineau's
appeal to "les44 droits et les sentiments les plus chers A des sujets
britanniques.",

40 "In Quebec, a British City, with British courts of justice," closing arguments for the plaintiff in
Ortenberg v. Plamondon (1913), 14 D.L.R. 549 [Ortenberg,1913], published as The Quebec Jewish Libel
Case, Address delivered by S.W. Jacobs, K C., counsel for the Plaintiff, before the Superior Court, Quebec,
May 23, 1913 (Montreal: The Jewish Times, 1913) at 31, and quoted inAnti-Semitism I1: The Plamondon
Case and S. W. Jacobs, Part 2, compiled by David Rome (National Archives, Canadian Jewish Congress,
1982) at 151.
41 Resolutions of the House Assembly of Lower Canada (21 February 1834) at Res. 5
[Resolutions],
online: La Biblioth~que 6lectronique du Qu6bec <http://jydupuis.apinc.org>; and 1837 Nos H6ros,
<http://pages.infinit.net/nh1837>.
42 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (London: Faber and Faber, 1963) at 177 [Arendt,
"Revolution"]. See also Barbara Black, "The Constitution of Empire: The Case for the Colonists"
(1976) 124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1157; Liam S6amus O'Melinn, "The American Revolution and
Constitutionalism in the Seventeenth-Century West Indies," Note, (1995) 95 Colum. L. Rev. 104.
43 Fernand Ouellet, "Le Mandement de Mgr Lartigue de 1837 et la
reaction lib~rale" in Cook,
Brown & Berger, supra note 38, 67 at 73; and Robert Chodos & Eric Hamovitch, Quebec and the
American Dream (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1991) at 56ff. This interpetation will be discussed in
more detail, in section IV(B).
44 Resolutions, supra note 41 at Res. 2. Rolland's background
and his links to this tradition are
discussed in more detail below. Quebec journalists had made claims to freedom of the press on the basis
of the English Constitution as early as 1788: Marcel Trudel, Mythes et rdalitis dans l'histoiredu Quebec
(Montreal: Hurtubise HMH, 2001) at 253.
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Judge Rolland's allusions to the rights of British subjects have led
some to understand him as saying that Quebec should adopt the English
law of libel.4 5 As he put it, however,

I am not ... to be understood to say that the law here which gives redress in cases of
defamation is the same as the law of England. I mean no such thing; for it is different in
many respects. It is not for me to vindicate our municipal [Lower Canadian] law; it may be
better or worse. The courts are to judge according to law, taking the law to be wise.4

If anything, there is reason to suspect that other judges had decided
earlier cases according to common law principles, and that Judge Rolland

was disputing that approach by showing that the civil law was capable of
evolving so as to recognize freedom of the press. Although there are few

records of judicial decisions in Lower Canada in the first half of the
nineteenth century, at least one later case suggests that some Quebec
judges had applied the English law of libel without regard to civil law
principles. 47 This seems to have been in accordance with the general

practice of some of the judges of that period, many of whom had emigrated
from the United Kingdom and been trained in law there.48 Judge Rolland
stated in his address to the jury that
... as respects the general doctrine of libels as connected with the press, no British subject
need be alarmed, for he is to have all the benefit arising from constitutional rights. ... With
this opinion deliberately given on this occasion, ... I entertain a hope that we shall hear no
more of the imperfection of the law of this country ... as regards the liberty of the press.49

His words seem like one half of an argument as to whether the civil law or
the common law should be followed, a response to opinions expressed in
50
other cases now lost to us.
45Nicole Valli~res, La Presse et la Diffamation: rapportsoumis au Minist~re
des communicaitions
du Quebec (Montreal: Wilson & LaFleur, 1985) at 45.
46 supra
note 2 at 446.
47 See Poitevin v. Henry Morgan & Co. (1866), 10 L.C .Jur. 93 at 97: "... the jurisprudence
of this
province has necessarily followed the English practice as in all respects the most fitting and convenient."
48 Greenwood, supra note 30 at 25-26; Evelyn Kolish, Nationalisme et Conflits de Droits:ledibat
du droit privi au Quibec, 1760-1840 (La Salle, Qufbec: Hurtubise HMH, 1994) at 107-26, 143-59
[Kolish, Nationalisme].
49
Mousseau, supra note 36 at 446.
50 But see Evelyn Kolish, "The Impact of the Changes in Legal Metropolis on the Development
of Lower Canada's Legal System: Judicial Chaos and Legislative Paralysis in the Civil Law, 1791-1838"
(1988) 3 Can. J.L. & Soc. 1. Kolish maintains, with respect to legislative initiatives during the period
before the Rebellions, that the British "refused to countenance any modernization or clarification of
the law that followed the French model, since improvement of the civil law would in no way aid in
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Judge Rolland's praise of British institutions may not have been
unusual, but the assertion that British subjects in the colonies had the same
constitutional rights as English citizens was. When Judge Rolland made his
judgment, responsible government 5 in Quebec was perhaps a year old. The
extension of English parliamentary principles to the Colony had been
resisted by both prior British colonial administrations and by rival political
parties, and the idea that English constitutional principles fully applied to
the Colony was still novel.
At the same time, freedom of speech in France, "that country from
which we have our civil law,"52 remained far more restricted than in
England. Although the French Revolution had proclaimed the free
communication of ideas and opinions as one of the most precious of the
rights of man, and stated that every citizen may speak, write, and print with
freedom,5 3 post-revolutionary governments imposed heavy-handed
penalties, including capital punishment, on journalists who wrote
defamatory columns." Repression ebbed and flowed but during the century
after the Revolution censorship existed in France almost continuously.
Laws preventing the free expression of opinion were passed there in the
1830s, and again in 1848, the year that Gugy was decided.55
This meant that for most of the nineteenth century the Quebec
courts had little civil law tradition of freedom of expression on which they
could draw, either in the received law of the French Monarchy, as it existed
at the time when Quebec became subject to the British Empire, or in later
French jurisprudence. By treating freedom of the press as a matter of
constitutional law, Judge Rolland was able to invoke English tradition
instead. Libel law was still, in his reasoning, part of the French-derived civil
law, but it had to be modified to reflect new constitutional principles.

remaking the Canadiens into British subjects": ibid.at 6. If this attitude carried over into 1848, Rolland's
approach was more controversial than it would seem at first glance.
The usual meaning of responsible government in the Canadian context
is colonial selfgovernment in which control of government is vested in a popularly elected legislature, rather than in
appointees of the colonial office, and the executive holds power only so long as it has the confidence
of the legislature.
52 Supra note 2 at 446.
53

France, National Assembly, Declarationof the Rights of Man and of the Citizen
(26 August 1789),

art. 11.
54 Bruno Cyr, La Diffamation, l'Injure,le libelle, dans la Provincede Quibec (B.C.L.
Thesis, McGill
University, 1953) [unpublished] at 15.
55 Ibid. at 15-16; Valli~res, supra note 45 at 46; Rivard, "De la libert6 de la presse," supra note 28
at 37-38.
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Accordingly, Judge Rolland adopted a distinction between public
and private figures. In a defamation lawsuit brought by a private figure, the
defendant was not allowed, in most cases, to even plead the truth of the
libel. However, if the statement was made in a newspaper about a public
figure, or concerning the actions of government, truth became a defence.
As he explained:
... there are imputations affecting character where evidence of truth may be admitted even
in this country. For instance, when in the discussion of political affairs and public occurrences
a writer in a newspaper canvasses the public character of public men, or the measures of
government, which every citizen has a right to do, there may be justification and evidence of
truth would not be rejected, provided that it be the opinion of a court or jury that it was done
with a laudable motive; not so, however, if with a malignant intention, and particularly if
56
private character is assailed, for there can be no justification for malignity.

The apparent anglophilia of Judge Rolland's decision was mild in
comparison with Champagne v. Beauchamp,57 where British-born, Frencheducated judge, Sir Francis Godschall Johnson58 wrote:
... however great our obligations in other respects to the civil law of France, ... we owe it
nothing as respects the liberty of the press or the right of public discussion. Whatever we
have of these, is due to a beneficent rule of England, and to the constitutional freedom that
followed it, and without which the early and heroic French colonists of this country could
never have dreamed of, nor their descendants ever have attained, the blessings of the liberty
59
they now enjoy.

Judge Johnson's language evokes the ideology of imperialism, according to
which the British invaded and took up the burden of administering foreign
lands in order to civilize and educate the local inhabitants.6 ° Liberty of
speech was seen as a blessing given by a beneficent sovereign. However, the
language of Judge Rolland's decision was different. Although he called
freedom of speech a "boon," he also characterized it as a right that is
intrinsic to the status of being a British citizen.6" This language is similar to

56 Mousseau, supra note 36 at 447.
57 [1886] 2 M.L.R.(S.C.) 484, aff'd (1887), 16 R.L. 506 [Champagne].
58 Pierre-Georges Roy, Lesjuges de la Province de Quibec, (Quebec: R.Paradis, Imprimeur de Sa
Majest le roi, 1933) at 277.
59 Champagne,supra note 57 at 488.
60 See e.g., Hannah Arendt, Imperialism:Part Two of The Origins of Totalitarianism,(New York:
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1968) at 87ff.
61 Supra note 2 at 446.
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that of liberal reformers in both Upper and Lower Canada during the first
half of the nineteenth century.62
Judge Johnson dealt with the issue again three years later in the
case of Trudel v. La Compagnied'Imprimerie et de Publicationdu Canada,63
a defamation suit over newspaper reports concerning a member of the
Senate of Canada that stated that, among other libelous allegations, he had
visited thefolies bergdres.64 The Senator was a newspaper publisher himself,
described in the defence to his claim as "the most outrageous, the most
and the most insulting of all known journalists
violent, the most 6insolent,
5
and polemicists.,

The Quebec civil law had been codified in 1866, eighteen years
after Judge Rolland's decision. Accordingly, the Court began its analysis
with article 1053 of the Civil Code, which, as it then read, stated that "every
person capable of discerning right from wrong is responsible for the
damage caused by his fault to another, whether by positive act, imprudence,
neglect or want of skill."66 Nonetheless, according to the Court, reporting
on the deeds and misdeeds of public figures was a public good according to
basic principles of public law. Making such reports could not be considered
a "fault" as that term is used in article 1053. As the Court explained:
[T~he rights and liberties of the people of Canada completely take out of the category of
wrong-doing or fault (culpa), to which alone the article relates, the performance of a public
duty in a truthful and honest manner. ... This is the law of England, and even of modern
France ......

Where Judge Johnson's earlier decision had described liberty of
speech only as a gift from the Crown, this one explicitly saw it as inhering
in the structure of government:

62 See Paul Martin Romney, Getting It Wrong: How CanadiansForgot Their Past and Imperiled
Confederation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) c. 3-5.; Smith, supra note 38.
63 Trudel, supra note 32.
64On the infamous visit to the Folies-Bergres, see Kenneth J. Munro, A Biography of FranvoisXavier-Anselme Trudel Quebec's Foremost PoliticalMaverick in the Nineteenth Century (Lewiston, N.Y:
Edwin Mellen Press) at 117-18.
65Trudel, F.X.A., CourSuperieurno 1036 [microforme]: l'honorableF.XA. Trude,
demandeuret
la Compagnie d'imprimerie et de publication du Canada, difenderesse, (1888) Canadian Institute for
Historical Microreproductions/Institute canadien de microreproductions historiques, Microfiche series,
no 93461 (Statement of Defence) [translated by author]. Original can be found at the Quebec National
Library, Montreal.
66 Civil Code of Lower Canada,Art. 1053.
67 Trudel, supra note 32 at 302.
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I certainly understood from the time of Judge Rolland's ruling [in Gugy v. Hicks], and have
ever since held, that this liberty [of the press] is part of our law, as necessarily incident to our
political constitution, which itself is surely part of our law, and without this liberty and this
law we could not use our constitution. But ... if it can be shown that the things published by
the defendants are not true, and are not for the public good, they must lose the benefit of
their plea of justification; for private slander or libel admits of no excuse or justification
whatsoever; and the only truly modern application of the old saying, "the greater the truth,
the greater the libel" consists of the personal and private nature of the thing charged, the
publication of which becomes the grosser offence in proportion to the more personal and
private character of the act or the infirmity which the victim has a right to withhold from the
public gaze .... 6'

In the opinion of the court, damaging statements about a private individual
were actionable even if they were true; truth could, however, be a defence
to a libel claim against a journalist, where the statements complained of
were published in the public interest, about public men or women.
The case of Vigeant c. Poulin6 9 adopted the same principle, but
without any reference to British liberties. It arose out of another election
dispute, in which one side publicized comments that had been made
privately by the other side's candidate about the immoral conduct of nuns
in Beloeil and in France, and about the "moeurs et habitudes s6ductrices
et sodomitiques de tous les cures en gen6ral, et de certains cur6s
sp6cialement indiqu6s ..... 0 The defendant pleaded that he had been
exercising a "droit sacr" guaranteed by the constitution, and had a right to
make the candidate's comments known to the public. The trial judge
acknowledged that "la libert6 6lectorale, consacr6e par notre droit public"
could not function if voters did not have a right to discuss the candidates,
and that electoral rights could not be subordinated to the ordinary rules of
defamation.7t Nevertheless, he found the defendant liable because the
conversations had been private, not public matters. The appellate court
reversed the decision, holding that these conversations had to do with the
candidate's public life, and that in denouncing these malicious and
outrageous remarks, the defendant was fulfilling a duty of conscience "dans
l'exercice d'un droit garanti par la constitution, celui du libre examen de la
conduite et des actes publics des candidats

68 Ibid.
at 303.
69(1890), 20 R.L. 567 (C.A.).
70
71

Ibid. at 569-70.

Ibid. at 571.
72 Ibid. at 577-78.
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These principles were again acknowledged by the Quebec appellate
court in Graham c. Pelland.73 That case concerned allegations made at a

political meeting by the province's Minister of Public Works that the rival
for his party's nomination had been put forward by "mountebanks" who
"concocted their plans in a backshop on Saturday night in the course of a
drunken orgy."74 The court decided that the publication of these remarks

in a newspaper was a purely private matter, not covered by the privileges
for statements made in the public interest. The court also accepted that the
distinction between libels against private individuals and those against
public figures and institutions was a part of Quebec law,75 considering it

unnecessary in the circumstances to address
the role that freedom of the
76
press plays in a parliamentary democracy.
In La Compagniede Publicationdu "CanadaRevue" c. Mgr. Fabre,77
the court maintained that
the right of free discussion of public matters ...
exists as the right of the subject as such. In the
interpretation of our law as to what constitutes injurious defamation ...
we must consider not
what rights ...
the citizen may have had under the old regime, but what rights he has to-day
under our constitution. If we find that in England to-day, wider liberty of criticism is allowed
to the subject as such, than might perhaps have been tolerated in France under the old
r6gime ...
we must in the application of our law bear in mind the existence of that wider
liberty.'s

The case should not necessarily be considered a victory for liberty of the
press; this line of reasoning was used to support the right of the archbishop

to exercise his freedom of speech by issuing a ban prohibiting Roman
Catholics from reading, printing, selling, or possessing the plaintiffs

publications.
At the end of the nineteenth century, although freedom of speech
became better established in France and Quebec's private law had become
codified in the first Civil Code of Lower Canada, the courts generally
continued to ground freedom of the press in English constitutional
principles. Gugy remained the leading case on the issue into the early part
of the twentieth century.79 Quebec law had evolved a distinction between
73 (1896), 5 B.R. 196.
74 Ibid. at 197.
75
76

Ibid. at 202-03.
Ibid. at 205.

77 (1894), 6 C.S. 436.
78 Ibid. at 446-47.
79 Gazette Printing,supra note 8 at 345, Girouard J., dissenting.
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private and public figures, pursuant to which libels against public figures
were to some degree shielded from defamation suits by constitutional
protections, while libels against private figures were not. Truth was a
defence to a libel lawsuit in public matters; but, unlike in the common law,
truth was not a defence to a defamation lawsuit brought by a private figure.
As one legal scholar wrote in 1907, Quebec's law of libel was neither
English nor French; it was based on Quebec case law and was different
from either the English common law or the European civil law systems.8 0
Although several of the reported judgments expressed admiration for
British legal principles, most did not say that the English law of libel
applied in Quebec. They generally stated the matter in terms of the
application of English constitutional principles, not English libel law.81
Instead of applying the common law, the judges elaborated legal rules that
were unique to Quebec and manifested the spirit of those general
principles.
B.

HistoricalContext: The Judiciary,Rebellion, and Change

In this section, I will discuss the role that the British Constitution
played in Quebec political and legal thought and the backgrounds of two of
the judges who invoked it. Many of the relevant cases seem particularly
dated, if not embarrassing, because of their extravagant praise of British
institutions and traditions. In order to understand that language and why
it was used, I will attempt to provide historical context, suggesting that the
expression of such sentiments was in fact characteristic of those advocating
liberal reform and greater colonial self-government.
When the Quebec cases, discussed above, spoke of the English
"Constitution," they were appealing to something that many people in
82
North America now would not even think of as fitting under that label.
Unlike Canada or the United States, Great Britain has no single document
or set of documents that can be referred to as its constitution. The English
Constitution is one only in an older sense of the word.83 It is a set of basic
rules and principles that restrain, structure, and give authority to the
exercise of government power. It is built on documents such as the Magna
80 Frederick Parker Walton, The Scope and Interpretation of the Civil Code of Lower Canada

(Montreal: Wilson & La Fleur, 1907) at 116 [Walton].
81 See e.g. Belleau v. Mercier(1882), 8 Q.L.R. 312 at 316.
82 See Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1848, vol. 1 (New York: Vintage, 1945) at
104: "In England, the constitution may change continually, or rather it does not in reality exist...."
83 Cf. James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an age of Diversity, (New York:

Cambridge University Press,1995) at 59-62, 149-54 (a comparison of ancient and modem constitutions).
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Carta, but also on traditions that have never been definitively written down.
It is often described as unwritten and flexible, in contrast to the codified
and difficult-to-amend American Constitution.
Many would argue that it gives no real protection to individual
rights. For example, in a 1942 decision of the House of Lords, Lord Wright
maintained that "in the constitution of this country there are no guaranteed
or absolute rights. The safeguard of British liberty is in the good sense of
the people and in the system of representative and responsible government
which has been evolved. ' ' . "For the past two centuries," according to a
recent evaluation, "the prevailing British constitutional ideology ... has
treated British citizens as subjects of the Crown, without the benefit of
fundamental constitutional rights giving legal protection to the individual
against the state and its agents." 85 Thomas Paine would have agreed; his call
for the independence of the American colonies from Britain was in part
based on the claim that "the so much boasted constitution of England"
offered no protection for freedom.86
The view that the constitution did not protect individual rights may
have dominated by the end of the nineteenth century, but it was not the
only view. Others maintained that basic liberties such as freedom of speech
were protected under it.87 I will discuss two such writers, Joseph Towers and
Jean Louis de Lolme.
Towers, writing in the late eighteenth century, focused on a narrow
issue: the extent of the power of juries in libel trials. A number of judges
instructed juries in criminal libel cases that the role of the jury was limited
to determining whether the words about which the plaintiff complained had
actually been published; by contrast, assessing whether the statements were
actually libelous was a question of law reserved for the judge.88 Towers,
saying that "no constitutional question of more consequence has been
agitated since the [English] Revolution," argued that this measure was

84 Liversidge v. Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206 at 261.
85 Lord Lester of Herne Hill, "Human Rights in the British Constitution" in Jeffrey Jowell &
Dawn Oliver, eds., The Changing Constitution, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) 89
at 90.
86
Thomas Paine, "Common Sense" in Writings, ed. by Moneure Daniel Conway (New York: AMS
Press, 1967) at 72.
87 A.W.B. Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European
Convention (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 32-33 [Simpson].
88 See Dougall,supra note 30, for a later Quebec case discussing this issue.
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incompatible with freedom of the press and a free constitution, and that the
jury had a duty to decide all questions of law and fact in a criminal trial.8 9
Jean Louis de Lolme's The Constitution of England, first published
in Amsterdam in 1770 or 1771, devoted two chapters to the liberty of the
press. 90 He maintained that the English Constitution had, in effect, taken
the power of censorship from officers of the state and placed it "into the
hands of the people at large," 9' so that there could be no censorship prior
to publication, and any attempt to sanction publications had to proceed by
way of trial before jury.92 At that time, these were understood to be
significant protections. In the words of the editor of the 1853 edition,
commenting on these passages: "There is nothing more remarkable in the
history of the British Constitution than the liberty which has been acquired
by the press." 93
De Lolme's book was widely read. At least fifteen editions of it
were published in England between 1775 and 1853. 9' De Tocqueville
considered him, with Blackstone, one of the two "most esteemed authors
who have written upon the English Constitution,"95 and his book has
recently been described as "far and away the most successful work on the
English Constitution [in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries],
apart from Blackstone." Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the
Laws of England supported the positions taken by Towers and De Lolme;
Blackstone had maintained that "[tihe liberty of the press is indeed
97
essential to the nature of a free state.,
89

Joseph Towers, Observationson the Rights and Duties of Juries, in Trialsfor Libels: Together with

Remarks on the Origin and Nature of the Law of Libels (London: For J. Debrett, 1784), reprinted in
Joseph Towers & Francis Maseres, An Enquiryand Observationson the Rights and Duty ofJuries/Enquiry
into the Extent of the Powers of Juries (New York and London: Garland, 1978).
90
Jean Louis de Lolme, The Constitutionof England:or,An account of the English government; in
which it is compared, both with the republicanform of government, and the other monarchies in Europe,
ed. by John Macgregor (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1853) c. 12, 13.
91 Ibid. at 200.
92 Ibid. at 203.
93

Ibid. at 202..

94Simpson, supra note 87, identifies fifteen English editions between 1772 and
1834, and I relied
on a later edition, not mentioned by him, published in 1853. French editions were published in
Amsterdam and Paris.
95 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1848, vol. 2, ed. by Phillips Bradley (New York:
Knopf, 1963) at 355.
96 Supra note 87 at 32.
97Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 4, ed. by
William G.
Hammond (San Francisco: Bancroft-Whitney, 1890) at 151.
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There is room to argue over whether these studies of the British
Constitution were an accurate description of the system or an idealization.98
It is always difficult in law to separate description from advocacy; as in any

system that looks to old texts as authority, actors will often bring about
change by presenting the changes as a true interpretation of the older texts.
What is important for our purposes is that there was an established
tradition within the British Empire according to which the Constitution was
seen as preserving basic civil liberties."
This tradition was strong in Lower Canada in the decades before

the 1837 Rebellions. De Lolme, a lawyer from Geneva whose book was first
published in French, was often cited, as was Blackstone." Their doctrines

were invoked by parliamentarians at the beginning of the nineteenth
century as a way of opposing the measures of the colonial government. 10'
Long after responsible government was achieved, Quebec jurists in the late
nineteenth century continued to maintain that the rights and freedoms
inherent in the British Constitutional structure had become part of Quebec
law when Quebec became an English colony,0 2 and to base claims for
provincial autonomy on the argument that the provincial governments had
gained their existence and powers in accordance with the British
Constitution." 3 As two nineteenth century authors put it: "With the British
Constitution Jean Baptiste was a veritable Oliver Twist. He
was not
'' 4
satisfied with the morsels doled out, but ever asked for more. lt

98 Cf. Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, trans. by Thomas Nugent, vol. 1 (New York:
Hafner Press, 1959) at 162, ending his influential account of the liberties enjoyed under the British
Constitution by writing that: "[i]t is not my business to examine whether the English actually enjoy this
liberty or not. Sufficient it is for my purpose to observe that it is established by their laws; and I inquire
no further."
99 See Marquis, supra note 38; Smith, supra note 38; Romney, supra note
62.
100 Smith, supra note 38 at 24-25, 27-28.
101 Ouellet,
supra note 43; Chodos & Hamovitch, supra note 43.
10 2
Edmond Lareau, Histoiredu droit canadiendepuis les originesde lacoloniejusqu 'anos jours, vol.
2, Domination anglaise (Montreal: A. P6riard, 1889) at 54-68.
103 T.J.J. Loranger, Lettres sur l'interprdtationde la constituton fidiraledite l'Acte de L 'Amerique
britanniquedu Nor, 1867 (Quebec: Imprimerie A. Cot6 et Cie, 1883).
104 Robina Lizars and Kathleen Macfarlane Lizars, Humours of'37,grave, gay andgrim: rebellion
times in the Canadas (Toronto: W. Briggs; Montreal: C.W.Coates, 1897), using "Jean Baptiste" as a
generic French Canadian everyman.
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In Lower Canada, the most passionate judicial appeals to British
liberties were made by reformers °5 and by judges who made efforts to
restrain state power, rather than by advocates of imperial control. The
language they used was often similar to the way moderate Americans had

appealed to British constitutional rights as a way of opposing oppressive
measures of the English crown in the years before the American
Revolutionary War."°
Among the reported libel law cases, the most seemingly fervent

expressions of admiration for British constitutional principles are in
Charles-Elzrar Mondelet's dissenting opinion in Gugy v. Maguire.'0 The
appeal turned on a government official's claim that he could refuse to
produce crucial evidence under the cloak of executive privilege. One cannot
fully convey Mondelet's enthusiastic mixture of passion and sarcasm
without quoting him in detail:
I can not, I ought not, for a moment as a judge living and administering justice under
constitutional institutions, admit such a monstrous doctrine, a doctrine which prostrates to
the ground that liberty, that protection to life, honor, property, and to civil and religious
liberty, which this country has so much right to boast of, too valuable to be thus thrown away
and scattered to the four winds of Heaven! ...
I cannot, I must not assent to it. It is not law,
it is unconstitutional, it is tyrannical, it is monstrous; and it must more glaringly appear so,
when we come to reflect that an attempt is made to give it currency, and to fasten it on the
judges of the land, under constitutional responsible government....
In France, the Charte of 1814, has had the constitutional effect of effacing, obliterating,
nullifying the tyrannical 75th article of the Constitution of the an VIII, and it will be seriously
contended, that the glorious British Constitution will have less power to secure the rights of
the subject, than the Charteof 1814, under the French government! Impossible! Impossible!
With Magna Charta before my eyes, with the working of the incomparable constitution of
Britain and our own, with the Imperial Act of 1774, (Quebec Act) as the bulwarks of our civil
and political rights to fortify my position, I can never be brought to believe, and much less
to concede and proclaim, in a Court of Justice, that as British subjects, we are less free, less
secure in the exercise of our rights, than French subjects under the Charteof 1814, at the
time of the restoration. I never can, and I trust never shall acknowledge as a true one, the
paradoxical proposition, that, under the protection of the freest and best constitution in the
world, and the most solemn imperial statute guaranteeing our rights ...
that it will be in the

105 See Marquis, supra note 38; Smith, supra note 38; Romney, supra note 62; Jean-Marie Fecteau
& Douglas Hay, "'Government By Will and Pleasure Instead of By Law': Military Justice and the Legal
System in Quebec, 1775-83" in F. Murray Greenwood & Barry Wright, eds., CanadianState Trials:Law,
Politicsand Security Measures, 1608-1837 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) 129 at 160-61.
106 On this tradition in American thought, see Clinton Lawrence Rossiter, The PoliticalThought
of the American Revolution: a revised version ofpartiii of Seedtime of the Republic (New York: Harcourt,
Brace & World, 1963) at 46; Staughton Lynd, Intellectual Originsof American Radicalism (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1968) at 25; Arendt, "Revolution," supra note 42; Romney, supra note 62 at 52-55;
Tully, supra note 81 at 152-54.
107 (1863), 11 R.J.R.Q. 240 (Q.B. C.A.).
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any member of the government, to deprive the injured of the evidence which he
power of ...
may adduce, to entitle him legally to a verdict or a judgment."'

Charles-Elz6ar Mondelet's politics before he became a judge had
been generally radical, and he had been charged with seditious libel in
1828."° He had been defence counsel to accused Patriotes in the aftermath
of the rebellions, arguing before the court that they should be treated as
political prisoners, and he spent several weeks in prison himself in 1838
without any charges having been laid." ° There is irony in his praise of the
guarantees of rights under the glorious and incomparable British
Constitution, heightened by the fact that the plaintiff, whose rights against
the state he was championing, had fought on the side of the colonial
government to suppress the rebellion in 1837."'
The career of Judge Rolland, who integrated freedom of the press
with traditional French law in the Gugy v. Hicks case, was also marked by
the rebellions. When the first of the two Lower Canadian rebellions broke
out, Judge Rolland was sitting as a member of the judiciary in Montreal. In
March of 1838, he had issued a writ of habeas corpus releasing rebels who
had been imprisoned under martial law." 2 Eight months later, in
November, after the second of the rebellions, the governing Special
Counsel retroactively suspended habeas corpus in the colony. Two other
judges, Phillippe Bedard and Elz6ar Panet, held that this suspension was
unconstitutional. They issued writs ordering the Sheriff to release prisoners
held by the military and a third judge in Trois Rivi~res followed their
lead.' Rolland voiced initial approval of what they had done, lauding

108 Ibid. at 244-48.
109 Pierre-Georges Roy, Les juges de laProvince de Quebec (Quebec: R. Paradis, Imprimeur de
Sa Majest6 le roi, 1933) at 379.
110 Ibid. at 379; Marc La Terreur, ed., Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 10 (Toronto:
"Mondelet, Charles-Elzdar"; and Francis-J. Audet, "Les
University of Toronto Press, 1972) s.v.
Mondelet" (1938) 3 Les Cahiers des Dix 191 [Audet, "Les Mondelet"].
IIIPierre-Georges Roy, Les avocats de laregion de Qudbec (Levis: The Quotidien, 1936) at 211.
"Jean-Roch Rolland"; Jean-Marie Fecteau, "'The
112 Marc La Terreur, supra note 110, s.v.
Ultimate Resource': Martial Law and State Repression in Lower Canada, 1837-38" in F. Murray
Greenwood & Barry Wright, eds., CanadianState Trials:Rebellions and Invasionsin the Canadas,183739, vol. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) 207 at 219.
113
Beverley Boissery,A Deep Sense of Wrong: The Treason, Trialsand Transportationto New South
Wales of Lower CanadianRebels After the 1838 Rebellion (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1995) at 42-43; M.
Francis-J. Audet, Les juges en chefde laprovincede Quebec, 1764-1924, (Quebec: L'Action sociale, 1927)
at 104-05 [Audet, Lesjuges].
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Bedard for his courage and intelligence.' 14 The government, in a kind of
informal reference, privately asked several judges and law officers for their
opinions of the Panet-Bedard rulings; Judge Rolland was the only judge
consulted who said that Panet and Bedard were right.11 5 However, the
government then suspended the judges who had issued the writs, and Judge
Rolland changed his stance. Transferred to Trois Rivi~res to replace one
of the three judges, Judge Rolland rendered a decision upholding the
government's suspension of habeas corpus."'6 Although Judge Rolland went
on to become an appeals court judge, his failure of courage "permanently
damaged his reputation in liberal Canadien circles." '
The praise for British constitutional rights in the decisions of people
like Judges Mondelet and Rolland was more than pious rhetoric; they were
statements of principle from men whose lives had been caught up in the
fight over such ideals and who, each in their own way, had paid a price
because of it. Their convictions had to be set out in the language of British
constitutionalism, despite their first-hand knowledge of the limitations of
that system in practice, because it was the most effective judicial language
available in a British court for expressing those principles.
The rebellions in Upper and Lower Canada were minor precursors
to a wave of rebellions that swept through Europe in the mid-nineteenth
century. In 1848, the year that Judge Rolland rendered his decision in Gugy,
there was a worker's rebellion in France, democratic revolutions in the
German states, and rebellions in Italy, Bohemia, Hungary, SchleswigHolstein, and Denmark. 1848 was also a year of constitution-making.
Constitutions were adopted in Prussia, in the new federal union of
Switzerland, and in the Italian state of Piedmont; Austria would get a
constitution a year later; in 1849."' Progressive or radical social change

seemed, briefly, to be imminent: "Heaven on earth," wrote one historian,
114 Boissery, ibid.; F. Murray Greenwood, "The Montreal Court Martial, 1838-39: Legal and
Constitutional Reflections" in Greenwood & Wright, supra note 112 at 325.
115 Fecteau, supra note 112 at 230.
116 Greenwood, "The Montreal Court Martial, 1838-9: Legal and Constitutional Reflections" in
Greenwood & Wright, supra note 112 at 109; Audet, Lesjuges, supra note 113 at 111; Edmond Lareau,
Histoire du droitcanadiendepuis les origines de lacoloniejusqu'anos jours, vol. 1, Domination francaise
(Montreal: A. P6riard, 1889) at 309-10.
117 Greenwood, ibid.
118 See E. J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution: 1789-1848 (New York: Vintage Books, 1996);
entries for the years 1848-49 in Lawrence Urdang, ed., The Timetables ofAmerican History (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1981), and Judah Gribetz, Edward L. Greenstein & Regina Stein, The Timetables
of Jewish History:A Chronologyof the Most ImportantPeople and Events in Jewish History (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1993).
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"seemed nearer in 1848 than at any other moment in modern history... 9
For the generations that lived during the Canadian rebellions and the
revolutionary events in Europe, civil and constitutional rights had a tangible
immediacy.
As the people who lived through the 1830s and 1840s retired and
passed away, discussions about constitutional rights lost that immediacy.
Quebec barristers continued to make arguments based on the British
Constitution into the twentieth century, 20 but they were made in a more
conservative social and political context and no longer in a spirit of reform.
Concurrently, developments in jurisprudence led to a judicial style that had
little room for the principle-based reasoning of Judges Rolland and
Mondelet.
In constitutional law, Canadian judges in the nineteenth century
had grounded their findings "in the light of the understandings and context
of Confederation, and all wrote with passion and intensity about
Canada. '12 1 Partly under the influence of decisions rendered in appeals to
the Privy Council, this approach was supplanted as the twentieth century
began with a more formalistic, positivist approach, "a way of talking that
was empty and impoverished.' 2 2
A similar trend can be seen in other areas of law. Several legal
historians have described a change that took place in Quebec legal
discourse at the end of the nineteenth century. Where nineteenth-century
jurists cited a diversity of legal sources from many different countries and
legal systems, and attempted to elaborate underlying universal rules, the
lawyers of the early twentieth century emphasized a hierarchy of sources,
giving supremacy to the will of the local legislature. 123 The adoption of the
Civil Code in Quebec may have played a part, but similar trends can be seen
across North America. A parallel change is said to have occurred in

119 A.J.P.
Taylor, Europe: Grandeurand Decline (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967) at
27.

120 See e.g. the defence argument in Ortenberg, 1913, supra note 40, that "La croyance au Christ
fait partie essentielle de la Constitution anglaise." Sommaire de la plaidorie et des notes de J.E. Bedard,
Pour les d6fendeurs Plamondon & Leduc (June 1913) Canadian Jewish Congress National Archives,
Montreal (MC16, S.W. Jacobs papers, Box 2, file 1).
121 Richard Risk, "Constitutional Thought in the Late Nineteenth Century" (1991) 20 Man. L.J.
196 at 198.
122
Ibid. at 203.
123 David Howe, "From Polyjurality to Monojurality: The Transformation of Quebec Law, 18751929" (1987) 32 McGill L.J. 523; Sylvio Normand, "Une culture en redbfinition: la culture juridique
qu6becoise durant la seconde moiti6 du XIXe si6cle" in Bjarne Melkevik, ed., Transformation de la
culturejuridiquequdbecoise (Saint-Nicolas: L'Universit6 Laval, 1998) 221.
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Ontario, t1 4 and both appear to track a similar transition that occurred in the
United States at the time of the Civil War, as the "Grand Style" of judging,
characterized by judicial creativity, an appeal to universal principles, and a
willingness to canvas civil law as well as common law doctrine, gave way to
a more positivist method of deciding legal cases.'2 5
This transition played itself out in Quebec decisions on defamation.
As the twentieth century began, the manner in which the decisions were
framed began to change. The older decisions had spoken of the need to
integrate basic principles of the unwritten British constitution into Quebec
civil law and treated the decisions of foreign jurisdictions, whether British,
American, or French, as persuasive raison icrite only. This approach had
made necessary a certain amount of judicial creativity, rewriting the law
inherited from an absolute monarchy to make it conform to new
constitutional principles. In the early twentieth century, there was no longer
any room for such an approach. Judges began to see the issue as an
either/or choice between English and French law, with no room for local
innovation.
C.

The Impact of Positivism and Nationalism, and the Sources of
Qualified and Absolute Privilege

Defamation cases from Quebec reached the Supreme Court of
Canada twice in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Both cases
spoke of the application of English libel law, along with, or instead of,
English constitutional principles. They recognized that British principles of
libel law had been modified by Quebec usage, but the emphasis was
shifting, at least on the surface, to a more faithful adoption of principles
from outside Quebec.
In the first such case, Gazette PrintingCompany v. Shallow, which
came before the Court in 1908, Justice Girouard stated that "libel by
newspapers ... should be judged according to the rules of the common law
of England ... subject, of course, to such modifications as the usage of our
people have sanctioned."'2 6 Justice Girouard, writing these comments in a
dissenting opinion, was the only judge to canvas the case law from Quebec.
The majority decision, however, did not disagree with him on this point,
simply stating that both sides conceded that under the law of Quebec, "the
124 G. Blaine Baker, "The Reconstitution of Upper Canadian Legal Thought in the Late-Victorian
Empire" (1985) 3 L.H.R. 219.
125 Grant Gilmore, The Ages ofAmerican Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977) at 19-67.
126 Gazette Printing,supra note 8 at 345 [emphasis added].
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principles applicable to the particular question in controversy in this appeal
do not differ from the principles of the common law,'127 and proceeding to
decide the case without any reference to Quebec jurisprudence.
In Price v. ChicoutimiPulp Inc. ,'t Supreme Court Justice Brodeur
affirmed the distinction in law between private and public individuals, and

that constitutional protections applied to the latter:
In the beginning, under old French law ... subjects of the realm were forbidden from
publishing libels against the King, his counsellors, magistrates and officers or against the
public administration and the government ....
This statute was the law of Canada at the time of the cession of the country. It was never
formally revoked here, to my knowledge. But the establishment of representative and
democratic institutions as part of our public law implicitly had the effect of putting to an end
this vestige of an absolute monarchy. Public men, in accepting to be representatives of the
people, submit themselves to the criticism of the public and questions of public interest must
necessarily be debated so that the people, who are now masters of their own destinies, can
judge with full knowledge of the case.
I believe therefore that we cannot find a more sure guide to this subject than English
law ....

129

Justice Brodeur's judgment then goes on to canvas the opinions of textbook
writers in England, the United States, and France as well as case law from
Quebec, all to the effect that a qualified privilege provided a valid defence

only if the comments made were true.
All four of the other judges proceeded to decide the issue on the
basis of common law principles. Two of them, Justice Duff concurring with
the majority and Justice Anglin in dissent, made it clear that English legal
principles came into play only because the public interest was involved.
Justice Anglin stated that "under Quebec law... the truth of the alleged libel
... should be deemed a defence only if the publication is also alleged and

proved to have been made in the public interest and concerning matters of
public moment," 30 distinguishing Quebec law from the common law, under
which truth is always a defence. Accordingly, a majority of the justices
accepted that a different standard of liability applied when the public
interest was involved, and none of the justices disagreed with this point. All
of them saw the issue as being whether English or French law applied, in

127 Ibid. at 359.
128 See Price,supra note 28.
129 Ibid. at 211-12 [translated by author].
130 Ibid. at 202-03.
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contrast to the more principle-based jurisprudence of the nineteenthcentury judges.
The lower courts took up the newer formalist approach.
Exemplifying the more technical, choice-of-law analysis, in 1906 the court
in Marcotte v. Bolduc 3' considered allegations that a doctor's negligence or
incompetence had caused twenty-five people to die of diphtheria.
According to Justice Langelier,
even though an action for injury done to another is governed by French rather than English
law, we must turn to English law when it is a question of the justification for a defamation
published in a newspaper article. Freedom of the press was unknown in the old French law,
but it is a basic principle of our present-day public law, which is English law. Accordingly it
is in English law that one must look for the rules that govern freedom of the press in matters
of defamation.'

No Quebec cases were cited for this argument; the decision refers
exclusively to English precedents, with over a third of the reasons for the
decision consisting of quotations from the English Court of Appeal.
In the twentieth century, most of the discussion over the national
origins of libel law arose in cases concerning privilege for courtroom
testimony and statements written in court pleadings. In English law, such
statements are absolutely privileged; a person who had been defamed by a
witness could not sue even if the statements were made with malice. By the
first decade of the twentieth century, some Quebec judges had held that
English law applied to protect such statements. Court process was a part of
the administration of justice, which was governed by English practice and
principles, and so the protections allowing witnesses and litigants to speak
freely had to be governed by English rules.'33 By contrast, other cases
drawing on French sources held that no privilege was absolute. They
maintained that the protection for defamatory remarks contained in court
pleadings applied only if the remarks were true and necessary to the
argument of the case; if not, no privilege applied. 34
In the 1912 case of Carringtonv. Russell,t35 the court avoided either
approach. Justice Laurendeau held that English law had no application, but
did not refer to the French sources. Instead, he held that courtroom
131 (1906), 30 C.S. 222 [Marcotte].
132 Ibid. at 225 [translated by author].
133 See Walton, supra note 80 at 42; Wilkins v. Major (1902), 22
C.S. 264.
13 4
Pacaudv. Price(1870), 15 L.C. J. 281 (B.R.) [Pacaud];Hall v. Le Maire de Montral
(1883), 27
L.C. Jur. 129 (B.R.), affd (1884), 12 S.C.R. 74.
135 42 C.S. 71 [Carrington].
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testimony was governed by the Code of Civil Procedure136 and the basic
principles concerning fault set out in the Civil Code. Because, he reasoned,
testifying in court was a duty imposed by law, a witness was immune from
suit for statements made in good faith. Differing from contemporary
English law, Justice Laurendeau held that a witness could be liable if the
statements were made with malice and were irrelevant to the subject of the
trial.
The editor of the case reporter series in which Carrington was
printed took exception to Justice Laurendeau's reasoning and attached to
the decision a detailed annotation arguing for the application of English
law. He maintained that constitutional, administrative, and political law are
all part of public law, which comes from England, and that individual rights
emerge from the nature of being British subjects. Accordingly, in the
absence of local legislation, judges should look to English common law to
determine the nature and extent of such rights. 37
The editor went on to argue that:
our courts are essentially British courts, they are one of the branches of government, they
have been a British institution since the change in sovereigntywas introduced to this country.
It follows, from this, that those who play a role in the courts, whether as magistrate, as
must all enjoy the privileges and immunities that are
lawyer, as clerk, as a party or a witness,
138
guaranteed by English public law.

Arguments similar to those in the annotation were urged on the
court by both sides in Ortenberg v. Plamondon the following year. t39 The
case was probably the most controversial and well-publicized libel trial in
the province. The action was brought by a member of the Jewish
community of Quebec City against a notary who had given an anti-Semitic
speech that had been followed by acts of violence and a boycott of Jewishowned businesses. Counsel for the defence argued that British law should
apply because the defendant's rights of free speech were involved. The
plaintiff, while asserting that on this issue there was no difference between
the two legal systems, said that British law would apply because the

136 Code of Civil Procedure of the Province of Quebec, S.Q. 1897, c. 48. See Martin Boodman
&
John E.C. Brierley, Quebec Civil Law: an Introduction to Quebec Private Law (Toronto: Emond
Montgomery Publications, 1993) at 52.
137Ibid. at 71-72.
138 Ibid. at 72-73 [translated by author].
139 Ortenberg, 1913, supra note
40.
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plaintiffs rights as a citizen were at stake.1 4 The judges, on the other hand,
saw no need to decide which source of law should apply. The trial judge and

the appellate court based their decisions on both English and French
authorities, without giving greater weight to one or the other. The appellate
court decisions, which found in favour of the plaintiff, focussed on private
law rather than constitutional or public law issues.'4 '
The position that had been taken in the editor's Carrington
annotation was, nevertheless, followed in the 1931 case of Desrochers v.
College des Mdecins.t42 Justice Denis held that the law governing libel was
found in article 1053 of the Civil Code and in old French law, as it existed
at the time Quebec was ceded to the British Empire. However, he found
article 1053 to be too general to be of much assistance, and that the old

French law was in this respect out of touch with the changes in social and
moral conditions that had taken place over the years. Accordingly, he

stated:
... faced with this difficulty, the tribunal has two options: to innovate, that is to create rules
of law that must govern the case before us, or else to borrow from foreign legislation and, by
analogy, from rules whose wisdom and justice has been tested by time and experience.
Between these two alternatives the tribunal opts, without hesitation, for the second.
Considering that: amongst foreign legal systems, English law is perhaps the most complete
and most perfect in matters of libel, and the one that adapts best to the social and moral
conditions of our province; and that, if one is to adopt foreign law, English law is surely the
one which we must look to first .... 113

Citing cases that held that it was permissible to refer to English law
as raisonicrite in cases where it did not differ from the law of Quebec, and
observing that Quebec cases had always recognized the privileges that
applied in English libel law, the judge exonerated the defendant by saying
140 The papers of plaintiff's counsel Samuel Jacobs in the collection of the Canadian Jewish
Congress National Archives, Montreal, include the pleadings and memoranda of argument in the lower
court. According to the defence, "...il est impossible d'appliquer simplement notre droit civil sans tenir
compte des droitsque Plamondon avait de discuter publiquement ces mati~res, droits qui sont inh~rents
&la qualit6 de sujet brittanique." Plaidoirie de Mtre. J.A. Lane, Conseil de Defendeur [n.d.], Canadian
Jewish Congress National Archives, Montreal (S.W. Jacobs Papers, MC 16, Box 2, file 1). According
to the plaintiff, "s'il y a des differences entre le droit anglais et le droit frangais, elle devrait 8tre d6cidte
je crois selon le droit anglais et ceci parce qu'il s'agit surtout du droit du citoyennet6, d'atteinte au droit
des gens, et que dans une cause semblable les decisions anglaises doivent nous gouverner; mais je crois
qu'il n'y a pas au fond de differences.... Plaidoirie de Mtre. Couture en r6plique,(26 May 1913)
Canadian Jewish Congress National Archives, Montreal (S.W. Jacobs Papers, MC 16, Box 2, file 1).
141 (1914), 24 B.R. 69, 385 [Ortenberg,
1914].
142 (1931), 69 C.S. 82 [Desrochers].
143 Ibid. at 93 [translated by author].
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that the defamatory remarks were privileged because the defendants had
published them pursuant to a statutory duty.
English law of privilege was applied by a five-member panel of the
Quebec Court of Appeal, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, in Langelier
v. Giroux,1" an extreme example of the mechanical, choice-of-law approach.
The case turned on whether the privilege for statements made in courtroom
testimony was absolute, as it was in English law, or whether it was a
qualified privilege that could be defeated by proof of malice. The court held
that the privilege protecting the testimony of a witness at trial was
governed, as a matter of public law, by the common law. 145 However, they
also held that it was the common law as it existed in 1763, when Quebec
first became subject to British law, which should apply. At that time, they
maintained, the46privilege had not yet become absolute, and so the suit was
1
tenable in law.
Three of the judges gave additional reasons: Justice Dorion stated
that the English law of 1763 was directly applicable; Justice Rivard agreed
but gave more emphasis to placing English law principles in the context of
article 1053 and mentioned that French law led to the same result; Justice
Letourneau stressed that the English law had to be subordinate to the Civil
Code and that its role was to serve as a guide to the application of article
1053.14 Nonetheless, the arrit that spoke for the full court explicitly stated
that it was the English law of 1763 that governed. t48 Where in Desrochers
the court had advocated turning to English law because the law inherited
from the time of the French monarchy was out of touch with changing
social and moral conditions, the Court here chose as an alternative an
English law that, if it ever existed, had been frozen in time for almost two
centuries.
Avoiding explicit judicial law-making is an aspect of legal
formalism; the judge should apply legal rules, not make up new ones.
144 (1931), 52 B.R. 113 [Langelier].
145 Ibid. at 113-15.
146 Ibid. at 114-15. The contention that the privilege was only a qualified one in 1763 England is
debatable. In The King v. Skinner (1772), 98 E.R. 529 at 530 (K.B.), Lord Mansfield stated that the
privilege existed even if the witness had acted in bad faith, a defining characteristic of absolute privilege,
and his reasons for judgment indicated that there were no earlier precedents to the contrary. By the late
nineteenth century, British judges described the privilege as having been absolute since time
immemorial: Munsterv. Lamb (1883), L.R. 11 Q.B. 588 andDawkinsv. LordRokeby (1873), L.R. 8 Q.B.
255, aff'd (1875), L.R. 7 H.L. 744.
147
Langelier,supra note 144 at
129.
148 A similar position was taken in Mailliv. La Compagnie de Publicationdu
Canada (1913), 43
C.S. 397, denying the applicability of a privilege created in England by legislation passed after 1763.
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However, another aspect of formalism is the importance attached to
consistency and to developing, or preserving, the law as a coherent legal
system. The idea that the definition of a wrong should be interpreted
according to one set of rules while the defences should be based on another
avoids the need to innovate, but it leads to incoherence in the body of law
taken as a whole. This was anathema to
some who saw uniformity of the
149
value.
important
an
as
system
law
civil
The theme of the integrity of the civil law system is found in the
t and is often viewed in terms
writing of both English and French jurists, 50
of a struggle between legal academics, who see the bigger picture, and
practitioners, who seize whatever authorities they can find to support their
position."t ' But it has also been greatly nourished by the connection drawn
by many writers between the civil law and the preservation of Quebec's
traditional French culture and identity, a theme that resonated particularly
strongly in the years between the two World Wars.' Law increasingly came
to be seen, at least by jurists, as a cornerstone of that identity, as
"l'expression naturelle des moeurs, des coutumes, de la vie m~me d'un
peuple."' 53 Where lawyers and judges in the late nineteenth century tended
to emphasize similarities between the legal systems, stressing that the rules
of both take "their origin in reason and the necessities of the position"'" an
important group of Quebec legalists in the interwar period were more
inclined to stress the differences, seeing each legal system as a
manifestation of a unique national spirit or genius that should be kept
pure.'5 5 Even those who advocated borrowing from English precedents in
order to modernize the old law still could feel compelled to describe the
1 49

Although Pierre-Basile Mignault, one of the most prominent advocates of the need to maintain
the integrity of the civil law, was more accepting of the application of English precedents with respect
to the freedom of the press against libel claims than he was with respect to other areas of the law. See
P.-B. Mignault, "L'Avenir de notre droit civil" (1922) 1 R. du D. 56 at 64 [Mignault].
150 For an English language condemnation of the "infiltration" of English law, see Jack S.
Bobrove, "The Law of Defamation in the Province of Quebec" (B.C.L. Thesis, McGill University, 1953)
[unpublished] at 8.
151 Ibid. at 124; Mignault, supra note 149 and accompanying text.
15 2

Nicholas Kasirer & Jean-Maurice Brisson, "The Married Woman in Ascendance, The Mother

Country in Retreat: From Legal Colonialism to Legal Nationalism In Quebec Matrimonial Law
Reform, (1866-1991)" University of Manitoba Canadian Legal History Project Working Paper Series
(Winnipeg: University of Manitoba, 1993).
153 Marechal Nantel, "Autour d'un d6cision judiciare sur lalangue franqaise en Canada"
(1941)
6 Les Cahiers des Dix 145 at 145.
154 As counsel put it in Pacaud,supra note 134 at 293.
155 Normand, supra note 123; Lionel Groulx, Histoire du CanadaFranqaisdepuis ladcouverte,
t.
2, Le Rdgime britannique au Canada, 4th ed., (Montreal: Fides, 1960) at 318.
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influence of the common law with metaphors of disease and military
invasion, as a gangrene or an insidious infiltration.'56
In the 1830s, French-Canadian reformers had demanded the
adoption of English public law in order to further colonial selfgovernment.157 In the 1930s, with the battle for responsible government
long since won, the adoption of English public law was itself seen by a
significant number of jurists as a form of cultural colonialism.
Adjutor Rivard, the judge who had been less enthusiastic about
applying English law principles than any of the other members of the panel
in Langelier,was one of those who believed in keeping the stream of the
civil law pure, a belief that was intertwined with his devotion to traditional
Quebec culture. He had written several popular books romanticizing the
old rural life of the province,"' and is perhaps best remembered today for
his pioneering linguistic studies of the French dialects spoken in Quebec.'59
He valued "the doctrine of our law, natural, healthy, logical, inherited from
the old French law and supple enough to adapt to the new conditions of our
era, and which we must defend against the introduction of foreign
elements."' 6° As he had explained in 1925:
If our wariness of what comes from case law [English law] seems exaggerated [to an observer
from France], is it not justified by our particular situation? It is important from all points of
view, religious, national, social and economic, to assure that our Province maintain the
civil law; and, because of our milieu, the least concession could be the
integrity of our French
161
beginning of defeat.

Justice Rivard first gave special attention to libel law and freedom
of the press in an extended essay, "De la libert6 de la presse," presented to
the Royal Society of Canada in 1923.162 In it, he argued that limitations on
156 Victor Morin, a Montreal notary, began an article that advocated the adoption of a variety
of

English law principles concerning secured loan transactions by warning against the anglicization of the
civil law, comparing the spread of common law approaches to the progress of gangrene and describing
it as an "infiltration insidieuse," a "penetration constante et pernicieuse." See Victor Morin,
"L'Anglicisation de notre droit civil"(1937) 40 R. du N. 145.
157 See Resolutions, supra note
41.
158 Adjutor Rivard, Chez Nous (Our Old Home), trans. by W. H. Blake (Toronto: McClelland &

Stewart, 1924); Adjutor Rivard, Chez Nos Gens (Quebec: Edition de I'Action Sociale Catholique, 1918);
and various essays in Adjutor Rivard, Contes etproposdivers (Quebec: Garneau, 1944).
159 See e.g. Adjutor Rivard, Etudes sur lesparlersde Franceau Canada (Quebec: J.-P. Garneau,
1914).
160 Rivard, "De lalibert6 de lapresse," supra note 28 at 101 [translated by author].

161 Adjutor Rivard, "Bibliographie"(1925) 3 R. du D. 233 at 235 [translated by author].
162 Supra note 28.
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freedom of the press were the price that had to be paid to maintain social
order. 63 He regretted that prior censorship of newspapers no longer
existed, considering that it was better to prevent harm than to punish it
after the fact; for him, censorship was legitimate and it was only particular
uses of it that could reasonably be disputed.1" He maintained that the press
should not have any special privileges and that a strict liability standard
should continue to apply to defamatory statements made in newspaper
articles. Good faith and a belief that the statements were true should never
be an excuse, as the journalist always had the option of remaining silent. 65
Justice Rivard found it regrettable that Quebec jurists often
referred to the English law of privilege. Instead, for him, it was preferable
to argue that the existence of responsible government created a situation
in which the rational application of civil law principles logically led to the
same privileges. A consideration of the social conditions of the province,
the character of its public institutions, and the political constitution of the
country gives rise to the same privileges as in English law without need for
explicit borrowing. The privileges come from
public policy, not public law.
' 66
intact."'
reste
droit
"n6tre
explained,
As he
In some respects, his position was closer to the judges of the
nineteenth century than to those of the first decades of the twentieth. Like
Judge Rolland, he chose to adapt the civil law to a democratic polity rather
than borrow doctrine from the common law. The difference was that the
older judges made decisions that advanced a liberal agenda, while Justice
Rivard was conservative, resisting any further changes to the law.
Perhaps out of a spirit of judicial collegiality, Justice Rivard's
concurring decision in Langelierhad not fully reflected the stance he had
taken earlier in his writing. However, in a series of cases that followed
Langelier,he strengthened his stand, arguing that the various privileges of
English libel law should be grounded in the Civil Code without need to refer
to English sources. In Duhaime v. Talbot, he argued that "the doctrine on
this point [privilege] is known. It flows entirely from article 1053 of the Civil
Code. Our borrowings from the English law of the expressions absolute
privilege and qualified privilege change nothing; they are the immunitj
absolue and immuniti relative known in French law."' 67 Two years later, in
Corporationdu Village de St. -Filicienv. Tessier, he argued that
163 Ibid. at 57.
164 Ibid. at 46-47.
165 Ibid. at 65ff.
166 Ibid. at 59-60, 80-83.
167 (1937), [1938] 64 B.R. 386 at 390 [translated by author].
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it is article 1053 of our Civil Code and the doctrine of fault expressed in this article that
determines responsibility in cases of defamation. We have no need to borrow anything, in
that respect, from English law. In any event, English and French law in such cases hardly
differ in their essence. Whether one speaks of "absolute privilege" or of immunity, of
"qualified privilege" or of justification and relative immunity, so long as one takes into
account the special situations created by public law, one arrives at the same practical
results. " '

Justice Rivard never persuaded enough of the other judges on the
panels on which he sat to form a majority with him on this point; they either
disagreed with him or did not address the issue of sources of law at all.
Nonetheless, his opinion reflected a growing concern with the preservation
of the integrity of the civil law as a cohesive system, one threatened by
common law borrowings.
Echoing Justice Rivard, in the 1943 case of Houde v. Benoit, 69 the
two judges on the panel who referred to the source of the concept of
privilege stressed the pre-eminence of the Civil Code. According to Justice
Bernard Bissonnette, "[t]he action in matters of libel and defamation rests
on article 1053 of the Civil Code. It originates in French law and if, on many
occasions, the courts have particularized this doctrine by drawing on
English law, it is because English law does not differ from our old law." 7 0
Justice St-Jacques made a similar point.17 '
Justices Rivard and Bissonnette's opinions are sometimes taken to
have settled the matter. Still, their sentiments never commanded a majority
of the judges on the Court of Appeal and the rule that the English law of
1763 was the one that applied to privileges for courtroom testimony in
Quebec persisted into the 1960s,' 72 until the court in Langlois v. Drapeau
found that article 1053 pre-empted the application of public law
principles. t73
There is little mention of the issue after Langlois in 1962. The
jurisprudence had by then elaborated these principles until most of the
important practical questions were answered. The influence of the English
law became well enough entrenched in Quebec law that their sources were

168 [1939] 67 B.R. 456 at 458 [translated by author].
169 [1943] B.R. 713.
170 Ibid. at 729 [translated by author].
171 Ibid.
172 Jean Drapeauc. Albert Langlois et autres, [1960] R.L. 209 at 226 [Langlois, 1960]; Desmarchais
v. Morin et autres, [1961] C.S. 465 [Desmarchais].
173 [1962] B.R. 277 at 283 [Langlois, 1962].
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no longer an issue.'7 4 The English defence of fair comment, or commentaire
loyal, was adopted with minor variations.'7 5 The contemporary textbook
position is that references to English law are unnecessary because there is
already a large body of Quebec cases that have addressed the issues and
because a reasoned application of the general principles of the Civil Code
can lead to the same immunities and privileges as the common law without
the historical anachronisms that are attached to them in English libel law. 76
D.

The CharterEra

In 1975, Quebec's Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms was
enacted. It declared freedom of opinion and freedom of expression to be
fundamental rights. 77 It also affirmed that "every person has a right to the
safeguard of his dignity, honour and reputation"'78 and that "every person
has a right to respect for his private life."' 7 9 In cases of intentional and
unlawful interference with a Charter right, the Charter authorizes an award
of exemplary damages. 180 Christine Bissonnette, in her 1983 Masters thesis
on Quebec's law of defamation, maintained that defamation is grounded in
the Quebec Charter,balancing the competing rights to dignity of the person
and freedom of expression."' 1 Similarly, in his dissenting opinion in Snyder
v. The Montreal Gazette, 182 Justice Lamer argued that Charter rights to
freedom of expression should modify Quebec libel law by limiting the
amount of damage awards that would be otherwise payable in a defamation
lawsuit.
Bissonnette's suggestion has been followed in recent cases. The
legal analyses in decided cases often begin with a statement of Charter

174 For a contemporary assessment of the influence of English law, see Vincent BrousseauPouliot, "La Diffamation Mdiatique" (2001) 15 R.J.E.U.L. 161 at 166-67.
175 For a comparison of the fair comment defence in civil and common law, see Bertrand
c. ProulX,
[2002] R.J.Q. 1741 at 1753 [Bertrand].
176 Jean-Louis Baudouin & Patrice Deslauriers, La Responsabilitg Civile, 6th ed. (Quebec: E-ditions
Yvon Blais, 2003) at paras. 226-27, 272-78 [Baudouin & Deslauriers].
177
Supra note 7 at art. 3.
178Ibid. at art. 4.
179Ibid. at art. 5.
180 Ibid. at art. 49.
181Christine Bissonnette, La Diffamation Civile en Droit Qugbecois (LL.M. Thesis, Universit6
de
Montr6al, 1983) [unpublished] at 24-30.
182 (1988), 49 D.L.R. (4th) 17 at 28
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rights; 83 the standard of care has been modified to be more compatible
with freedom of expression and the Charter has been invoked to award
exemplary damages in a libel case."'
The change in the standard of care occurred in the 1994 case of
Societd Radio-Canadac. Radio Sept-Iles Inc. 185 In a radical departure from
past precedent, the Court of Appeal brought the standard of care that
applies to a journalist in a libel lawsuit close to that of the American
Sullivan rules. Prior to this case, as in the common law, most Quebec
authorities supported the proposition that any false statement that hurt a
person's reputation would lead to liability. In Radio Sept-Iles, however, the
Court of Appeal held that journalists should instead be held to the same
standard of responsibility as other professionals. Publication of false
information should ground liability only if the person who published it was
at fault, and fault should be determined according to the standard of what
a reasonable journalist would have done. If journalists take normal and
reasonable care in their research, and the matter is one of public interest,
they are not liable even if the statements made later turn out to have been
false.
Justice Le Bel, who was on the Court of Appeal for the Radio SeptIles decision, had occasion to expand on his views in the recent Supreme
Court case of Prud'homme c. Prud'homme,8 6 where he and Justice
L'Heureux-Dub pushed the civil law remedy for defamation even further
from the doctrines of the common law. They affirmed that the law of
defamation was grounded in Quebec's Charteras well as in the Civil Code
and that the standard of care was one of fault, rather than the strict liability
of the common law.'87 They made it clear that the fault standard applied to
everyone, not just to journalists, and that under the Civil Code it is
presumed that defamatory remarks were made in good faith unless it is
proved otherwise."" Fault is determined according to what a reasonable
person would have said in the circumstances. In deciding what is
reasonable, the court can consider whether the individual acted with malice;

183As in Guitounic.SocietiRadio-Canada,[2000] R.J.Q. 2889 at
2894-95, varied on appeal, [2002]
R.J.Q. 2691; Gervais c. Bouffard, [2001] R.J.Q. 1065; Bertrand, supra note 175 at 1749; Michaud c.
Angenot, [2002] R.J.Q. 1771 at 1776; Champagne c. CEGEP deJonquire,[1997] R.J.Q. 2395.
184 9 (H.) c. B.(G.), [19981 R.J.Q. 3065 at
3081
185 Radio Sept-Iles, supra note 27 at 43-81, taking up arguments in Valli6res, supra note 45.
186 [2002] 4 S.C.R. 663 [Prudhomme].
187 Ibid. at 688, 694-95, 698.
188 Ibid. at 694-95.
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the degree to which the individual checked the facts before speaking;18 9 as
well as the nature of the forum, the time, and the opportunity the individual
had to tell the full story. 9 °
The major conceptual innovation brought about by Prud'homme
was the virtual elimination of fair comment and qualified privilege as
distinct defences. In the view of the Court, these doctrines are useful when
the ordinary standard is one of strict liability because they are needed in
order to permit a more lenient standard of liability to apply to certain
comments made in the public interest. Privilege allows certain statements
to escape liability as long as they are made without malice; fair comment
allows one to express defamatory comments on matters of public interest
as long as the underlying facts are true. Nevertheless, if all defamatory
comments are evaluated according to a standard of reasonableness, the
special defences are unnecessary and redundant because the leeway they
allow in special cases is already built into the general liability standard. The
question of whether the comment was a fair one in the public interest, for
example, is treated as one of the considerations in the determination of
whether a reasonable person would have made the statement, rather than
as a separate defence.' What would be protected by fair comment in the
common law provinces would still probably not give rise to liability, but
there is no longer any defence of fair comment as such in the civil law.
Although the Court did not refer to American jurisprudence, its
reasoning followed that of the American Restatement of Torts. The Second
Restatement deleted the sections on fair comment found in the First
Restatement because they were considered superfluous after strict liability
gave way to a negligence standard.'92 The Second Restatement also
expressed the opinion that the fault standard would likely make the
common law privileges redundant.'9 3
By stating that the reasonableness of a statement depends on its
context, the Supreme Court left open the possibility that journalists may be
treated somewhat differently than other libel defendants. Lower court
decisions had recognized that freedom of expression and of the press are
the rights of everyone, not just professional journalists. Nonetheless,
according to some decisions, because journalists have a duty to inform the

189 Ibid. at 688, 698.
190 Ibid. at 703, 708-09.
191 Ibid. at 690-99.
192 Restatement, supra note 17 at § 566, 606-10.
193 Ibid. at §580(1).
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public,1 94 it is easier for them than for others to argue that their statements
were made in the public interest. Also, in judging whether they are acting

reasonably, the courts should take into account the realities and inherent
difficulties of being a journalist.

95

This does not mean that a defendant in a libel lawsuit is always
better off in Quebec than in the common law provinces. It remains the case
that even truthful statements can lead to liability in civil law if they injure
a person's reputation and it is not in the public interest to disclose them.' 96

Quebec has in the past been more receptive to group libel claims (that is,
claims brought by individuals for allegations concerning the group of which

they are a member) than have been the common law provinces, 197 and the
Quebec Court of Appeal has recently authorized a class action for group
defamation

98

As well, it has been maintained that a public figure has a

right to greater monetary damages because his or her reputation is more
valuable.' 99 However, in changing the standard of liability for defamation

from one of strict liability for falsehood to one of negligence, the Quebec
courts have made a major change favouring freedom of expression that the

common law courts in Canada have so far refused to make.
More than a century earlier, in the Trudel case, it had been held that
liberty of the press "is part of our law, as necessarily incident to our political
constitution, which itself is surely part of our law, and without this liberty
and this law we could not use our constitution."' Similar arguments are
used in Quebec jurisprudence now:

194 Barriere c. Filion [19991 R.J.Q. 1127
at 1151
195 Beaudoin c. laPresse Ltie, [1998] R.J.Q. 204 at 212 (C.S.)
[Beaudoin].
196 Radio Sept-Iles, supra note 27 at 1814, 1819, 1821; and Prudhomme,supra note 186 at 685-86.
Ortenberg, 1914, supra note 141; R. v. Robillard (1902), discussed in both David Rome,
AntiSemitism I: The PlamondonCase andS. W Jacobs,Part I (Montreal: National Archives, Canadian Jewish
Congress, 1982) at 80-80B and in David Rome, On Jules Helbronner, compiled by David Rome
(Montreal: National Archives, Canadian Jewish Congress, 1978); Bissonette, supra note 181 at 133-53.
A claim brought against a Chinese-language newspaper by 127 Falun Gong members for, among other
things, damage to reputation caused by an article critical of the Falun Gong movement was settled out
of court and a later proceeding brought to enforce the settlement was dismissed: Zhangc. Crescent Chau
(2003), 229 D.L.R. (41h)298 (Q. C.A.).
1 98

Malhab c. Mtromddia, [2003] R.J.Q. 1011 (C.A.), on behalf of one thousand taxi drivers who

speak Arabic or Haitian Creole. In Ontario, Justice Abella's concurring opinion in Elliott v. Canadian
Broadcasting Corp. (1995), 125 D.L.R. (4th) 534 at 540 (Ont. C.A.), leaves open the possibility that
claims for libel of a large group are maintainable.
199 Baudouin & Deslauriers, supra note 176 at 203; Rosalie Jukier, "Non-Pecuniary
Damages in
Defamation Cases" (1989) 49 R. du B. 3 [Jukier].
200 Supra note 32 at 303.
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the role of the press in the democratic process is fundamental and, in modern democracies,
the press has in practice become the eyes and ears of the citizen and an essential tool for the
citizen to play his role in a real and enlightened way. The press has become a necessary
watchdog to guarantee the proper functioning of democratic institutions.201

The law of defamation has become reconstitutionalized, and the
distinction between public and private figures remains firmly established in
the civil law.20 2 In language that harks back to the jurisprudence of the

nineteenth century, the courts have rejected the strict liability of common
law defamation and instead applied a standard of care that is closer to the
American actual malice standard.
V.

CONCLUSION

English libel law has long been seen as balancing competing claims
of freedom of expression, on the one hand, and protection of a person's
reputation, on the other,2 °3 even if many would argue that the balance is

tilted heavily in favour of reputation.2

4

It is a balance that evolved

gradually, together with changing ideas about the need for freedom of

speech in a parliamentary democracy. The adoption of the Canadian
Charterof Rights and Freedoms has not, as yet, significantly altered that
balance in the common law provinces 2 5 and the Supreme Court of Canada
has rejected arguments that it should do so.
In Quebec, freedom of speech did not evolve as an organic part of

traditional law. Instead, it was at first treated by jurists as something grafted
on from without, as a change imposed on the traditional rules by the
imposition of a new constitutional order. The problems that the common
201 Supra note 195 at 212 [translated by author].
202 Recent cases concerning a "personnage public" include Guitouni, supra note 183; Michaud,
supra note 183 at 1772-73; and Bertrand,supra note 175 at 1750. The distinction between public and
private personages is set out in Baudouin & Deslauriers, supra note 175 at 303; Emile Colas, "Le Droit
Alaverit6 et lelibelle diffamatoire" (1984) 44 R. du B. 637; and Brousseau-Pouliot, supra note 174 at
171. Jukier agrees only in part, maintaining that although the jurisprudence states that public figures
must accept greater criticism, this principle is not generally applied in practice. See Jukier,supra note
199 at 17ff.
203 See Pizza Pizza Limited v. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd.. (1998), 42 OR. (3d) 36 at 45 (Div.
Ct.).
204 See e.g. David Schneiderman, "Damage to Reputation: Civil Defamation or Civil Liberty?"
in David Schneiderman, ed., Freedom of Expression and The Charter(Toronto: Thomson Professional,
1991) 259 at 259; Klar, supra note 4 at 261; and Smolla, supra note 4 at 272.
205 But see Campbellv. Jones (2002), 209 N.S.R. (2d) 81 (C.A.), in which the Charterwas used in
support of the trend to expand the scope of qualified privilege to protect certain statements made to
the public at large on matters of public concern.

270

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 42, NO. 2

law faced for the first time with the adoption of the Charterhave been faced
by Quebec jurists over the past two centuries.
The approach taken in Quebec has not been static during this time.
It began as an explicit modification of traditional law in light of
constitutional values. It became a borrowing of aspects of English libel law
in cases where public law principles required a greater freedom of
expression than the traditional private law would allow. As Charterrights
have become a part of Quebec law, defamation has again become explicitly
grounded in constitutional principles.
What has always remained constant in Quebec, for as long as there
have been reported cases, is that public personalities have a more restricted
right to sue for defamation than do private personalities.2" 6 This approach
evolved because judges recognized that libel law straddled the boundary
between public and private law, and because they chose to apply
constitutional, or public law, principles to modify a private law doctrine. In
recent years, this approach has been strengthened by decisions stating that
falsehood, by itself, does not automatically give rise to liability provided
that a journalist has taken reasonable care before publishing the
statements. The Supreme Court has rejected the constitutionalization of
the common law of libel and any legal distinction between public and
private figures as an American innovation that should not be accepted in
Canada. But, in fact, this innovation occurred in Canada over 150 years ago
and was set out in decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada well before
it occurred in the United States. The doctrine created by this process of
constitutionalization is firmly established in Quebec and can be used as a
precedent for changes to the common law.

206 Supra note 174 at 171.

